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The Impact of Brexit on UK Labour Law 
 
MICHAEL FORD QC 
 
The recent vote by the UK electorate to leave the European Union (EU), known as Brexit, has 
potentially enormous implications for employment rights in the UK, most of which are now 
underpinned by EU law. At present the vote has no legal effect but if Brexit happens all these 
rights are legally vulnerable. The article examines how workers’ rights informed the debates 
surrounding Brexit, the history of the UK’s attitude to EU employment rights, and how the 
employment rights and remedies guaranteed by EU law currently affect UK labour law and 
policy. It analyses the legal mechanism likely to be adopted by the UK to change EU-
guaranteed employment rights post-Brexit, and highlights some of the factors likely to 
contribute to the future form of UK labour law, including UK government policy, the effect of 
employment tribunal fees, the trading relationship between the EU and the UK, and the 
position of the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland.  
 
1. INTRODUCTION 
 
On 23 June 2016 a referendum in the UK resulted in a vote to leave the EU - ‘Brexit’ 
as it has come to be labelled. The narrowness of the victory - 52 per cent for leave 
against 48% for remain - obscured deep divisions between regions (London and 
Scotland voted overwhelmingly to remain, for example), age groups, educational 
level, and classes which broke with traditional political party allegiances.1 The result 
sent out powerful shock waves throughout the UK and beyond, generating many 
unpredictable consequences. Most expected a ‘Brexit’ vote to lead to the replacement 
of the then Conservative Prime Minister, David Cameron, with a pro-leave 
‘Brexiteer’, probably the buffoonish right winger Boris Johnson. But following 
Cameron’s resignation on the day the result was announced the Government is now 
presided over by a ‘remainer’, Theresa May. The referendum also provided the spark 
which ignited the internal conflicts that now threaten to split the opposition Labour 
Party, led by a lukewarm ‘remainer’ on the Left, Jeremy Corbyn. It is hard to think of 
any time since the Second World War when UK politics have appeared more 
indeterminate and volatile.  
 
For the present, however, the legal position is unaffected. In the UK a referendum of 
this sort has no legal effect, regardless of the political impetus it creates.2 The UK 
cannot be compelled to leave the EU. Until the UK Government notifies the 
                                                 
 Professor, University of Bristol, UK and Queen’s Counsel. 
1 See e.g. the Yougov Survey Results at 
https://d25d2506sfb94s.cloudfront.net/cumulus_uploads/document/oxmidrr5wh/EUFinalCall_Re
weighted.pdf (accessed 23 August 2016). 
2 The European Union Referendum Act 2015 conferred power to hold the referendum but it 
imposes no duty to take any action after the result.  
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European Council that it has decided to trigger Article 50 of the Treaty of the 
European Union (TEU) and completes the painful process of negotiating a 
withdrawal agreement, the EU Treaties and secondary law continue to apply in full 
to the UK. The time-table envisaged by Article 50 is two years unless all members of 
the European Council agree, but longer may well be needed to disentangle a large 
state such as the UK from the EU.3 By the same token, for the time being the UK 
legislation which gives domestic effect to the EU Treaties, the European 
Communities Act 1972, remains in force unamended, as does the mass of UK 
legislation implementing EU law. There is still no firm time-table for the date when 
the UK will invoke Article 50, let alone any indication of the shape of the UK’s future 
trading relationship with the EU or when the process of extraction will be completed. 
 
Barring a radical volte face by the Government, the indications are that Brexit will 
take place in the not too distant future. The Government’s current position is that it 
will serve notice under Article 50 in early 2017. When and if Brexit eventually 
happens, leaving the EU will potentially have very profound effects for the legal 
rights of workers of the UK. Most of the existing individual employment rights in the 
UK are now underwritten by EU law, with the principal exceptions of unfair 
dismissal law and the legislation on the national minimum wage, neither of which 
falls within the current scope of EU law.4 Brexit will grant the legal freedom for a 
government to remove or water down these rights, and go much further in 
delivering the highly ‘flexible’, deregulated labour market to which successive UK 
governments, and especially Conservative ones, have aspired.  
 
This subject figured prominently in the debates prior to the referendum, though less 
so than other issues such as immigration. Most trade unions in the UK, and their 
umbrella organisation, the Trade Unions Congress (TUC), supported ‘remain’, in no 
small part owing to the EU-backed guarantees of workers’ rights. In his interventions 
in the Brexit debates, the Labour leader, Jeremy Corbyn, warned of the threat of a 
‘bonfire’ of workers’ rights if the UK left the EU.5 On the other side, prominent 
‘leavers’, repeatedly making pleas to regain control over ‘our’ laws, drew attention to 
what they claimed was the high cost of EU employment regulations, including those 
                                                 
3 For discussion, see the report of the House of Lords European Union Committee, The Process 
of Withdrawing from the European Union (2016), available at 
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld201516/ldselect/ldeucom/138/138.pdf (accessed 25 
August 2016). 
4 On pay, see Article 153(5) Treaty on Functioning of the EU (TFEU), though this does not 
prevent EU legislation which affect pay indirectly, such as equal pay laws: see Case C-268/06, Impact 
[2008] ECR I-2483 at paras 124-5; on dismissal, see Case C-117/14, Poclava v Ariza Toledano [2015] IRLR 
403. 
5 Reported in e.g. The Guardian, 14 April 2016 (at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/apr/14/jeremy -corbyn-leaving-eu-would-lead-to-
bonfire-of-rights; accessed 30 August 2016).  
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such as the Working Time Directive and the Temporary Agency Work Directive.6The 
Minister for Employment, Priti Patel, went so far as to call for the UK to ‘halve the 
burdens of EU social and employment legislation’ in the event of Brexit.7 In the 
mostly binary world of the debates, the effect of Brexit on EU-derived employment 
rights appeared straightforward: keep them all or dump most of them, especially the 
most expensive. 
 
But adopting rhetorical positions without the responsibility of power is one thing; 
taking decisions when in government is altogether different. The Brexit referendum 
result exposed a vacuum: the absence of any clear plan or vision within the UK 
Government about even the broad nature of the UK’s future relationship with the 
EU. Though for the moment the Conservative Government has proven much more 
successful than the Labour party at plastering over its internal divisions on Europe, 
those conflicts have not disappeared. What will in fact be the future shape of 
employment regulation in the UK, then, is a matter of radical indeterminacy.  In 
addition to the problem of knowing a future government’s policy towards 
employment rights, there is much uncertainty about how others involved in the 
process - the EU, the devolved administrations in Scotland, Wales and Northern 
Ireland, the electorate, workers and businesses - will respond.  
 
In the absence of clearer guidance, a useful starting points is the UK’s past stance 
towards EU-derived employment rights, which casts some light on the preferred 
candidates for removal or amendment in the future. I discuss this is the next section. 
In the third section I provide an overview of the current position of UK employment 
law and its intersection with EU social policy, to see what is potentially at stake. 
Finally, in the fourth section I sketch out the goals, factors and constraints which are 
likely to influence future legislative activity in employment law. 
 
 
2. THE UK’S PAST RELATIONSHIP WITH EU EMPLOYMENT LAW 
 
When the UK joined the then European Community (EC) by signing the 1972 Treaty 
of Brussels there was no indication of any tension between EU social rights and UK 
policy in the employment sphere. European social law barely existed at the tim e. It 
was only in the mid-1970s that the first Directives appeared, on equal pay and equal 
treatment between the sexes, collective consultation on redundancies, and transfers 
of undertakings;8 and it was not until 1976 that Court of Justice (ECJ) delivered its 
                                                 
6 Respectively, Directive 2003/88/EC and Directive 2008/104/EC.  
7 Speech to the Institute of Directors reported in e.g. The Belfast Telegraph, 18 May 2016 
(http://www.belfasttelegraph.co.uk/business/news/brexit-would-boost-uk-economy-by-43bn-
claims-patel-34723908.html; accessed 30 August 2016). 
8 See respectively Directive 75/117/EC (equal pay), 76/207/EEC (equal treatment), 
75/129/EEC (collective redundancies), 77/187/EEC (transfers). For a fuller account, see C. Barnard,  
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important ruling in Defrenne, holding that then Article 119 of the Treaty of Rome on 
equal pay between men and women was directly and horizontally effective because 
it was one of the ‘foundations of the community’.9  
 
This gentle wave of European social law washed against a UK system which already 
possessed a high degree of what now might be characterised as social employment 
law. Though the UK Government resisted Gabrielle Defrenne’s claim on the basis 
that increasing women’s pay would ‘seriously aggravate the problem of controlling 
inflation’,10 its argument was partly undermined by the fact that it had already 
unilaterally enacted legislation which gave a right to equal pay between the sexes, 
the Equal Pay Act 1970, even if that Act was not to come into force until 1975.11 
Similarly, the UK independently enacted legislation on sex and race discrimination  
before EU interventions in this area.12 Around the time of its accession to the EC in 
1973, the UK had laws conferring rights to written statements of terms and 
conditions,13 not to be unfairly dismissed,14 and to redundancy payments;15 a well-
developed system of wage councils laying down minimum wage rates and holiday 
entitlements in industries which lacked adequate collective bargaining;16 and a pretty 
comprehensive system of health and safety regulation applying to different 
workplaces, in which the overarching legislation provided for consultation with 
trade union representatives.17 Add to this a pretty much cost-fee employment 
tribunal for enforcing rights, extensive  coverage of collectively bargained terms, and 
statutory immunity against civil claims in relation to strikes in contemplation of 
trade disputes, and the very limited EU social initiatives in employment could 
almost be overlooked. 
 
It was with the election of the Conservative Government headed by Margaret 
Thatcher in 1979 that the conflict began to emerge between a domestic policy of 
labour market deregulation, ostensibly justified by monetarist economic theories, 
and an EU legislative programme aimed at giving a social dimension to the single 
                                                                                                                                                        
EU Employment Law (Oxford University Press, 2012), chapter 1.  
9 Case 43/75, Defrenne (No.2)  v Sabena [1976] ECR 455 at 470. 
10 Ibid. at 464. 
11 A point noted by the ECJ in Defrenne at 468. 
12 The Sex Discrimination Act 1975, held by the House of Lords in Duke v Reliance [1998] ICR 
339 not to intended to give effect to the then Equal Treatment Directive, and the Race Relations Act 
1968. 
13 The Contracts of Employment Acts 1963 and 1972. 
14 The Industrial Relations Act 1971, later re-enacted in the Trade Union and Labour Relations 
Act 1974. 
15 Originally the Redundancy Payments Act 1965.  
16 See S. Deakin and F. Green, One Hundred Years of British Minimum Wage Legislation  47 
British Journal of Industrial Relations 2056 (2009) 
17 See the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, especially s.2, and the subsequent Safety 
Representatives and Safety Committee Regulations 1977, SI 1977/500.  
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market. The conflict could not be buried in meetings of the Council of Ministers 
because of the increased powers given to the Council to adopt Directives in the social 
field by qualified majority voting instead of by unanimity. This meant that UK 
opposition was no longer a trump card. The process began with the new Article 
118a, on health and safety at work, inserted in the then Treaty by the  Single 
European Act 1986, and accelerated once the Treaties allowed Directives in the field 
of working conditions to be adopted by qualified majority voting.18 Adopted under 
Article 118a, the Working Time Directive19 perhaps provides the clearest illustration 
of the growing opposition of successive UK governments to EU social law. The 
Conservative UK Government resisted the Directive, tried to water it down and 
brought proceedings challenging its legality in the ECJ.20 Implementing legislation21  
was eventually introduced two years after the deadline when the New Labour22 
came into power, but that Government sought to exploit every possible derogation 
in the Directive.23 Since then successive UK governments have continued to press for 
changes to be made to the Directive, and the costs of this ‘controversial’ legislation to 
business were highlighted in the last Government’s review into the balance of 
competences between EU and UK employment policies.24 
 
If the opposition to the Working Time Directive was at the extreme end of the 
spectrum, it nevertheless illustrated what became the default position of UK 
governments towards EU social legislation. The attitude was not confined to 
Conservative governments but extended to the New Labour administrations in 
power between 1997 and 2010, whose Prime Minister, Tony Blair, famously 
congratulated the UK for having the ‘most lightly regulated labour market in any 
leading economy in the world’.25 The continuity of labour market policy across 
                                                 
18 See e.g. the new Article 118 introduced by the Amsterdam Treaty signed in 1997, and 
Barnard, supra n. 8. 
19 Then Directive 93/104/EC, now Directive 2003/88/EC 
20 See Case C-84/94, United Kingdom of Great Britain v Council of the European Union [1996] ECR 
I-5755. 
21 The Working Time Regulations 1998, SI 1998/1833. 
22 The label adopted by the government at the time, to distinguish itself from the more left 
leaning policies of its predecessors.  
23 Such as allowing derogations from the maximum weekly working time under Article 22 by 
means of individual agreements under regulation 4 of the Regulations. For discussion, see C.Barnard, 
The Working Time Regulations 1998, 28(1) Indus. L.J. 61 (1999).  
24 HM Government, Review of the Balance of Competences Between the United Kingdom and the 
European Union Social and Employment Policy (2014) 60-61, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/332524/review-
of-the-balance-of-competences-between-the-united-kingdom-and-the-european-union-social-and-
employment-policy.pdf. 
25 Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), Fairness at Work, Cm 3968 (HMSO, 1998),  
Foreword (at 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/+/http:/www.berr.gov.uk/files/file24436.pdf; accessed 
23 August 2016). 
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Conservative and Labour governments was striking, based on promoting a ‘flexible’ 
labour market.26 There are, of course, counter-examples to this broad brush picture. 
For example, the Labour Government signed up to the Social Chapter when it first 
came to power in 199727 and unusually expressed its ‘welcome’ for a new wave of 
EU Directives protecting against discrimination at work,28 where UK legislation and 
policy broadly chimed with the EU initiatives. But enthusiasm for the Social Chapter 
soon waned, and the default position was expressed in that Government’s 
minimalist implementation of the Directives protecting part-time and fixed-term 
workers and its sustained opposition to the Temporary Agency Work Directive.29  
 
The resistance to EU employment initiatives became yet more pronounced with the 
election of a coalition Government in 2010, dominated by the Conservative party, 
which launched the ‘Red Tape Challenge’ to identify unnecessary regulations and 
made clear its vision of a labour market based on minimal intervention by 
government.30 In the same vein, in 2010 the Government adopted new Guiding 
Principles for EU legislation, expressing its desire to avoid regulation at EU level 
‘wherever possible’ and setting out its strategy of ensuring that in implementing EU 
law ‘the UK does not go beyond the minimum requirements of the measure which is 
being transposed’.31 This latter policy, coined under the name of avoiding ‘gold-
plating’, was reflected in (for example) amending legislation which reduced the 
period for consultations with worker representatives in large-scale redundancies to 
the minimum required by EU law.32 
 
This broad brush model of resistance to EU employment regulations by UK 
governments needs qualifying in at least two important respects. First, with the 
notable exception of the late introduction of the Working Time Regulations, the UK 
                                                 
26 See P. Davies and M. Freedland, Towards a Flexible Labour Market: Labour Legislation and 
Regulation Since the 1990s (Oxford UP, 2007) 11. 
27 Ibid. at 45-59. 
28 See the DTI consultation Towards Equality and Diversity (2001) at 4, available at 
https://www.education.gov.uk/consultations/index.cfm?action=conResults&consultationId=1168&
external=no&menu=3 (accessed 23 August 2016).  
29 Directives 97/81/EC (part-time work), 1999/70/EC (fixed-term work) and 2008/104/EC 
(agency work). For discussions of the background, see Davies and Freedland, supra n. XX, at 57-58, 87-
90. 
30 Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS),  Flexible, Effective Fair: Promoting 
Economic Growth Through a Strong and Effective Labour Market (2011), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32148/ 11-1308-
flexible-effective-fair-labour-market.pdf. 
31 HM Government, Guiding Principles for EU Legislation . The current version is at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/guiding -principles-for-eu-legislation (accessed 23 
August 2016). 
32 See the Trade Union and Labour Relations (Consolidation) Act 1992 (Amendment) Order 
2013, SI 2013/763. 
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government has never failed to implement Directives in the employment field, even 
if it has acted reluctantly and its official policy is to do so at the last minute and in a 
minimalist fashion.  Calls by a government advisor to take the extreme step of 
risking infraction proceedings before the ECJ rather than give effect to that perennial 
target of Conservative opposition, the Temporary Agency Workers Directive, went 
unheeded. The implementing regulations duly came into force two months before 
the deadline, albeit in the teeth of government opposition and packed with 
derogations and exclusions.33 
 
The second qualification relates to the effect of the dialogue between the two court 
systems, the ECJ and the UK courts. The impact of EU employment law has been 
significantly enhanced by rulings of the ECJ, which has typically given social rights a 
wide interpretation and consequently construed any derogations narrowly. The 
general principle is reflected in the ECJ’s repeated mantra in cases on annual leave 
that the right is a ‘particularly important principle of EU social law’.34 This approach 
was initially alien to the courts in the UK which, lacking a history of social or even 
human rights in domestic legislation,35 tend to focus on the wording of legislation 
rather than calibrating the importance of the right at stake. Consequently there are 
many examples of domestic rulings on EU social rights in employment where the 
UK courts have taken a narrow view of a right conferred by a Directive, sometimes 
while refusing to refer the issue to the ECJ, only to be effectively reversed by 
progressive decisions of the ECJ in favour of workers. Cases on working time again 
provide an excellent illustration. The confident analyses of the domestic courts on 
what the Directive meant, in a series of decisions which went in favour of employers, 
later turned out to be completely wrong.36  
 
                                                 
33 See A. Beecroft, Report on Employment Law (2011), at 15-16, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/31583/12-825-
report-on-employment-law-beecroft.pdf (last accessed 23 August 2016) and the Agency Workers 
Regulations 2010, SI 2010/93. 
34 See e.g. the Grand Chamber in Case C-520/06 Stringer v Revenue and Customs Commissioners 
[2009] ECR I-179 at para. 41 and recently in Case C-83/14, CHEZ Razpredelenie [2015] IRLR 746 at para. 
42. But cf. the discussion of Alemo-Herron and Usdaw in section 3 below. 
35 The European Convention on Human Rights was only given statutory effect in the UK by 
the Human Rights Act 1998.  
36 Examples of such cases from the Court of Appeal (CA) include: Marshalls Clay v Caulfield 
[2004] ICR 1502, CA (rolled-up holiday pay did not infringe Directive); cf. Case C-131/04 and C-
257/04, Robinson-Steele [2006] ICR 932, ECJ (yes it did); Gibson v East Riding [2000] IRLR 598, CA 
(Article 7 not directly effective); cf. Case C-282/10, Dominguez [2012] IRLR 321, ECJ (Article 7 is 
directly effective); Stringer [2005] ICR 1149, CA (workers on sick leave not entitled to annual leave); cf. 
Case C-520-06, Stringer [2009] ECR I-179, ECJ (yes they were); Bamsey [2004] ICR 1183, CA and 
Williams [2009] ICR 906, CA (no prescribed level of pay for annual leave under Article 7); contrast the 
ECJ in Case C-155/10, Williams v British Airways [2012] ICR 847 and in Case C- 539/12, Lock v British 
Gas [2014] ICR 813, holding that workers must receive their normal remuneration in respect of annual 
leave. 
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But, once corrected by the ECJ on the scope of the EU rights, the domestic courts 
proved to be enthusiastic about giving domestic effect to them. In complying with 
the Marleasing duty, they have adopted an aggressive approach to interpreting 
domestic employment legislation to ensure that it corresponds with the meaning and 
intention of the parent Directives.37 Thus the UK courts have been perfectly prepared 
to go far beyond the ‘ordinary’ meaning of domestic legislation and to ‘read in’ 
additional words to ensure that it achieves the result required by the relevant 
Directive.38 In this approach they appear to have gone considerably further than the 
courts of some other Member States,39 with the result that almost all EU employment 
Directives have full ‘horizontal’ effect in the UK.40 The combined effect of rulings of 
the ECJ and a radical domestic approach to interpretation has thus largely overcome 
the domestic courts’ initial unfamiliarity with social rights, and plugged any gaps 
exposed by the government’s policy of minimalist implementation. 
 
Running in parallel with the growth of EU social law was the trajectory of domestic 
labour law. It is no surprise that the deregulatory policies of UK governments since 
1979, including New Labour, were mostly opposed to the development of domestic 
‘social’ rights in employment. This is a long story which has been exhaustively 
explained elsewhere. Its central features are well known, including attacking legal 
support for collectively bargained terms and imposing many procedural and 
substantive restrictions on trade unions’ ability to take strike action.41 The assault on 
trade unions’ collective power was not accompanied by any significant 
compensation package of domestic, individual legal rights. Wage councils, for 
example, which set minimum rates of pay in sectors with weak collective bargaining, 
lost their powers in 1986 and were abolished in 1993.42 UK governments displayed 
little appetite for enacting employment rights which were not driven by Europe. The 
principal exceptions to this were in the discrimination field where the UK was at the 
forefront in enacting legislation on disability discrimination, though soon to be 
overwritten by EU law;43 the national minimum wage legislation;44 and the 
                                                 
37 Case C-106/89, Marleasing v La Comercial Internacional de Alimentacion SA [1990] ECR I-1435. 
38 For examples among many see Litster v Forth Dry Dock [1989] ICR 341, EBR Attridge LLP v 
Coleman [2010] ICR 242 and Bear Scotland v Fulton [2015] ICR 221. See too the summary of the 
principles in Rowstock Ltd v Jessemey [2014] ICR 550 per Underhill LJ at paras 40-41. 
39 See e.g. Case C-441/14, Dansk Industri v Estate of Rasmussen  [2016] IRLR 552. 
40 Contrast the isolated cases which prove the rule, holding that domestic legislation could 
not be construed in accordance with Directive 98/59/EC (on collective redundancies) to allow 
consultation to begin once redundancies are contemplated, are cited and questioned in UK Coal 
Mining v National Union of Mineworkers [2008] ICR 163 at paras 75-86. 
41 For full accounts, see P. Davies and M. Freedland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy 
(Oxford UP, 1993), chapters 9-10, and Davies and Freedland, supra n.26. 
42 By s.35 of the Trade Union and Employment Rights Act 1993. They had already many 
powers by virtue of s.11 of the Wages Act 1986.  
43 See the Disability Discrimination Act 1995 and, now, the Equality Act 2010. 
44 The National Minimum Wage Act 1998.  
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introduction of a statutory procedure by which unions could, after following a 
labyrinth of rules, gain recognition by employers for negotiations over pay, hours 
and holidays.45  
 
In accordance with the same policy goals, once New Labour was replaced by the 
coalition Government in 2010, existing individual rights in the employment sphere 
were removed, watered down or made difficult to enforce. This policy applied 
especially to those rights which cost, or were perceived as costing, significant sums 
to businesses. Three examples stand out. The first is health and safety claims by 
workers. In 2013, in order to tackle what it acknowledged was a perception of a 
‘compensation culture’,46  the coalition Government reversed a rule which had stood 
for over 150 years by which a worker injured as a result of a breach of safety 
regulations could bring a civil claim for damages.47 The second example concerns the 
right not to be unfairly dismissal, originally enacted in 1971. Though at one time the 
coalition Government dabbled with proposals to replace the right with ‘no fault’ 
dismissal,48 in the event it retained the right. But it increased the qualifying period 
from 12 months to two years and capped the maximum compensatory award at 12 
months’ gross pay,49 so excluding many workers from the right to claim or making 
the award of little value. The third critical element was the introduction of fees for 
bringing claims in the employment tribunal, based on the philosophy that ‘users’ of 
the tribunal service should pay for it and strongly influenced by business fears about 
high awards.50 Since their introduction in July 2013, fees have led to a precipitous 
decline in the number of tribunal claims brought, but the Government so far has not 
conducted its promised review into their effect.51  
 
                                                 
45 Schedule A2 to the Trade Union and Labour Relations Act 1992 and, for the end game, 
British Airline Pilots Association v Jet2com Ltd [2015] IRLR 543. 
46  BIS, Impact Assessment, Strict Liability in Health and Safety Litigation (2012), paras 17-18, 
available at https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/strict-liability-in-health-and-safety-at-
work-impact-assessment. 
47 See s.69 of the Enterprise and Regulatory Reform Act 2013, amending s.47 HSWA, and e.g. 
Couch v Steel (1852) 3 E & B 402.. 
48 See the Beecroft report, supra n. 33. 
49 See the Unfair Dismissal and Statement of Reasons for Dismissal (Variation of Qualifying 
Period) Order 2012, SI 2012/989 and the Unfair Dismissal (Variation and Limit of Compensatory 
Award) Order 2013, SI 2013/1949. 
50 See Ministry of Justice , Charging Fees in the Employment Tribunals and the Employment Appeal 
Tribunal, Consultation Paper CP22/2011 (2011), especially foreword at 3 -4 and 11-15 (available at 
https://consult.justice.gov.uk/digital-communications/et-fee-charging-regime-cp22-
2011/supporting_documents/chargingfeesinetandeat1.pdf; accessed 30 August 2016).  
51 See House of Commons Justice Committee, Courts and Tribunal Fees: Second Report of Session 
2016-17, available with the written evidence to the Committee at  
https://www.parliament.uk/business/committees/committees-a-z/commons-select/justice-
committee/inquiries/parliament-2015/courts-and-tribunals-fees-and-charges/ (accessed 23 August 
2016). 
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Though these initiatives crossed into areas governed by EU employment Directives - 
fees, for example, affect all types of claim, including those derived from EU 
Directives, and health and safety claims are now underpinned by EU law - the 
government was only too well aware that it had to tiptoe round the requirements of 
EU law. The main brake on its policies was the principle of effectiveness, now 
enshrined in Article 19 of the TEU, by which Member States must ensure the 
effective protection of EU rights. It includes a requirement that sanctions for breaches 
of EU law must be effective, proportionate and dissuasive.52 That principle forms the 
basis of a legal challenge by the trade union, UNISON, to the fees system which so 
far has been unsuccessful but which is proceeding to the UK Supreme Court.53 It is 
clear, for example, that the Government wanted to take action to limit awards of 
compensation for discrimination at work; but, as it acknowledged, EU law precluded 
any cap on awards, 54 ‘which effectively restricts the policy options available to 
address concerns in this area’.55  
 
While the UK policy of deregulation of employment rights was in tension with the 
social regulation emerging from the EU, the conflict between the two legal systems 
was much less pronounced in relation to the economic freedoms guaranteed by the 
TFEU, including freedom of establishment and freedom to provide services,56 as 
supplemented by the public procurement Directives.57  Earlier Conservative 
governments supported expansion of the EU to the East, in part to obtain access to 
cheap labour.58 Consistent with their labour market policy, the same governments 
were enthusiasts for legislation requiring contracting out of public functions, which 
prohibited the inclusion of ‘non-commercial matters’ in tendering decisions,59 and 
repealed rules by which public authorities required their contractors to pay ‘fair 
wages’.60 Here, then, UK law and policy was mostly in harmony with EU law. The 
deep, unresolved tension within EU law between the protection of fundamental 
labour standards and the rules of the internal market61 has no parallel in the UK, 
where governments wanted a free market in labour to prevail, unencumbered by 
                                                 
52 See e.g. Case C-432/05 Unibet [2007] ECR I-2771 and Case C-407/24, Camacho v Securitas 
Seguridad España [2016] ICR 389.  
53 R (UNISON) v Lord Chancellor [2016] ICR 1, CA. 
54 See Case C-271/91, Marshall v Southampton and SW Hampshire AHA [1993] ECR I-4367 and 
e.g. Article 18 of Directive 2006/54/EC. 
55 BIS, Employment Law Review: Annual Update 2012 (2012), 15-16, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/32146/12-p136-
employment-law-review-2012.pdf (accessed 23 August 2016).  
56 See Articles 49 and 56 TFEU. 
57 Such as Directive 2014/24/EC.  
58 See P. Anderson, The New World Order (Verso 2009), 38-39. 
59 Local Government Act 1988, s.17 (now repealed). 
60 For the history, see C. McCrudden, Buying Social Justice (Oxford UP 2007), 42-53. 
61 See the illuminating discussion by M. De Vos, Internal Market and Euro-Crisis: Labour Law 
Under the Gun of the European Union?, ERA Forum 14 335-361 (2013). 
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legal props or government support for collective bargaining. This may explain, too, 
why there has been little ECJ case-law from the UK of the sort which has arisen in 
other Member States, such as Germany, grappling with the tension between the 
imposition of wage rates laid down in sectoral collective bargains and the economic 
freedoms in the Treaties.62  
 
Another economic freedom, the right to free movement of workers, guaranteed 
principally by Article 46 TFEU, was at the heart of the inflammatory debates during 
Brexit about immigration from the EU into the UK. This large topic strays far beyond 
employment policy, and I will not examine it here. My focus will be on the effect of 
Brexit on social rights in the employment sphere. 
 
3. THE CURRENT POSITION 
 
It is a historical curiosity that the Brexit referendum occurred at a time when the 
conflict between employment rights emanating from Europe and a deregulatory 
employment law agenda in the UK had entered a period of truce and calm, probably 
as a result of the austerity policies adopted by the EU. No significant Directives were 
introduced after the Temporary Agency Work Directive was finally passed in late 
2008.63 Recent Commission publications increasingly use similar language to UK 
government policy papers, referring to the need to avoid over-regulation and to the 
‘red tape’ holding back small businesses.64 While there are no proposals to remove 
existing employment rights, the Commission’s current work programme in 
employment is very restrained indeed, with the emphasis on monitoring the 
coherence and effectiveness of existing legislation, rather than introducing new 
Directives.65 The most significant proposal, to amend the Posted Workers Directive 
                                                 
62 For example, Case C-346/06 Rüffert [2008] ECR I-1989, Case C-549/13 Bundesdruckerei 
[2014] IRLR 980 and Case C-346/06, Regiopost [2016] IRLR 125. 
63 Directive 2010/18/EU, on parental leave, was a revision of the earlier Directive 96/34/EC, 
and in common with its predecessor did not require that leave be paid. Likewise the Works Council 
Directive 2009/38/EC was a recasting of the earlier Works Council Directive 94/45/EC.  
64 See e.g. the Commission communication, Better Regulation for Better Results - an EU Agenda, 
COM (2015) 215 final (2015) at 5-7 (available at http://ec.europa.eu/smart-
regulation/better_regulation/documents/com_2015_215_en.pdf (accessed 24 August 2016), drawing 
on the Better Regulation Guidelines SWD (2015) 111 final (2015), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/smart-regulation/guidelines/docs/swd_br_guidelines_en.pdf (accessed 24 
August 2016). 
65 See the Commission Work Programme 2016 COM(2015) 610 final at 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/cwp_2016_en.pdf (accessed 24 August 2016) ; and the List of 
Planned Commission Initiatives (2016) at 
http://ec.europa.eu/atwork/pdf/planned_commission_initiatives_2016.pdf (accessed 24 August 
2016). The initiatives include, for example, a proposal to recast the three  information and consultation 
Directives to make the law simpler and a proposal to amend the Framework Directive 89/391/EEC 
on health and safety to modernise it and improve its flexibility. There is also a consultation on giving 
more flexibility in work arrangements for parents and carers: see the Commission Consultation 
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so that rates of pay set out in collective agreements which have been declared 
‘universally applicable’  apply to posted workers, is of little relevance to the UK 
because it has no system for making collective agreements legally binding across a 
sector.66 Nor would the Commission’s proposal for a ‘European Pi llar of Social 
Rights’ directly affect the UK even if it remained in the EU because it envisages 
rights restricted to those countries in the euro-zone, with an option for others to join 
if they wish and no more.67  
 
In addition, during the same period of austerity, the ECJ has subtly shifted its 
approach to employment rights, giving greater weight to the interests of business 
than it had hitherto. Two decisions shine out, though it is too early to discern a clear 
trend in the terse and Delphic language of the ECJ. In Alemo-Herron, the ECJ held that 
collective agreements in the public sector did not have ‘dynamic’ effect under the 
Acquired Rights Directive68 so as to upgrade the terms and conditions of local 
authority workers after their employment transferred to a private company. 
Drawing support from the freedom to conduct a business recognised in Article 16 of 
the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, the ECJ ruled that the Directive did not only 
aim to safeguard the rights of employees (which had been its previous position) but 
also sought to strike a ‘fair balance’ between the interests of employees and 
employers,69 The Court adopted a similar approach to the Collective Redundancies 
Directive70 in USDAW v Ethel Austin, holding that its objective was not solely to 
protect workers but also to harmonise costs for EU businesses.71 
 
But a couple of decisions of the ECJ sympathetic to business and the absence of 
significant new employment Directives on the horizon were never going to be 
enough to quell the objections of ‘leavers’ in the Brexit debates to what they 
described as the ‘unelected’ Commission and the ‘unaccountable’ ECJ.72 The past 
                                                                                                                                                        
Document C(2016) 2472 final, dated 12 July 2016, available at http://ec.europa.eu/justice/gender-
equality/economic-independence/economic-growth/index_en.htm (accessed 25 August 2016).  
66 See the Commission Proposal COM(2016)128 final, available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/social/main.jsp?catId=471 (accessed 24 August 2016). 
67 See the Commission, Launching a Consultation on a European Pillar of Social Rights COM(2016) 
127 final, at para. 3 (available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?qid=1457706909489&uri=COM:2016:127:FIN; accessed 24 August 2016). For 
discussion, see K. Lörcher and I.Schömann, The European Pillar of Social Rights: Critical Legal Analysis 
and Proposals (European Trade Union Institute, 2016) 
68 Directive 2001/23. 
69 Case C-426/11, Alemo-Herron v Parkwood Leisure Ltd [2013] ICR 1116.  
70 Directive 98/59. 
71 Case C-80/14, [2015] ICR 675 at para. 62.  
72 See e.g. Michael Gove, one of the prominent leavers in the Conservative party, reported in 
the Daily Telegraph of 20 February 2016 
(http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/newstopics/eureferendum/12166345/European-referendum-
Michael-Gove-explains-why-Britain-should-leave-the-EU.html; accessed 25 August 2016).  
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record of the EU in dictating ‘tens of thousands’ of rules in all areas,73 including in 
employment, was a sufficient and irredeemable sin.  
 
Stepping back, we can see that by the time of the Brexit referendum, UK employment 
law was radically different from how it was at the time the UK joined the then EC in 
1973. A very substantial part of UK employment rights is now derived from EU law, 
and an even larger body is guaranteed by EU law. The importance of these EU rights 
is not just in terms of quantity: they are supported by strong EU rules on how they 
must be protected and enforced.  
 
A full account of the relevant rights is set out in an advice I wrote for the TUC prior 
to the Brexit referendum.74 In summary, they include  protection against 
discrimination owing to sex, pregnancy, race, disability, religion and belief, age, and 
sexual orientation throughout the employment relationship, including access to 
employment, treatment at work, dismissal and post-employment victimisation;75 
equal pay between men and women for work of equal value; health and safety 
protection of pregnant women and their rights to maternity leave, dismissal and 
maintenance of terms and conditions of employment; parental leave; a degree of 
equal treatment, in broad terms, for the growing number of fixed-term, part-time 
and agency workers; rights to protected terms and conditions and not to be 
dismissed on the transfer of an undertaking; rights of worker representatives to 
information and consultation about redundancies, transfers and health and safety; 
more general rights to information and consultation under the European Works 
Council Directive76 and the Information and Consultation Directive77 in 
undertakings above a certain size; the most important, general health and safety 
regulations which apply at work, including those governing workplaces, work 
equipment, personal protective equipment, display screen equipment and manual 
handling; the right to a written statement of terms and conditions; almost all the law 
on working time,78 including paid annual leave and limits on daily and weekly 
working time; and state guarantees of employees’ claims where an employer is 
insolvent.  
 
                                                 
73 See Michael Gove in the Daily Telegraph, ibid. 
74 M.Ford, Workers’ Rights from Europe: The Impact of Brexit (March 2016), available at 
https://www.tuc.org.uk/international-issues/europe/eu-referendum/workplace-issues/brexit-
could-risk-%E2%80%9Clegal-and-commercial (accessed 24 Auguest 2016).  
75 Nationality discrimination, included in the UK Equality Act 2010, is not dealt with in 
Directive 2000/43/EC on race discrimination, though discrimination against EU nationals is 
prohibited by Article 45 TFEU. 
76 Now Directive 2009/38/EC.  
77 2002/14/EC. 
78 The exception is that UK law guarantees paid annual leave of 5.6 weeks, not the minimum 
of four weeks in the parent Directive: see regulation 13A of the Working Time Regulations 1998.  
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Areas beyond EU social law have also had an important influence on employment 
regulation in the UK. For example, the EU Directive on the processing of personal 
data,79  to be replaced in May 2018 by the new Data Protection Regulation,80 led to 
the Data Protection Act 1998. This Act in turn generated a code of practice in the UK 
which assists in regulating how employers process data about and monitor their 
workers81 - an area in which there was little domestic law at all beforehand. 
 
Moreover, as explained in my advice to the TUC,82 these rights are underpinned by 
relatively strong rules for giving effect to them which in the UK are probably as 
significant as the rights themselves. First, as explained above, the domestic courts 
have taken a radical approach to the duty to interpret national law in accordance 
with EU law law.83 Second, in the unlikely event that interpretation does not achieve 
harmony with EU law, many EU employment rights are sufficiently clear to be 
directly effective - principally against state bodies but also horizontally, against 
private employers, in the case of the right to equal pay in Article 157 TFEU and the 
nascent category of ‘general principles’, such as the prohibition of discrimination. 84 
Third, the UK government has invariably complied with rulings of the ECJ in 
infringement proceedings that its law is out of step with Directives on employment 
law, no doubt conscious that if it fails to do so it may be sued directly for its failure to 
implement EU law.85 Finally, the EU rights are underpinned by strong principles on 
procedures and remedies, including the principle of effectiveness which led, for 
example, to the removal of historical caps on compensation for discrimination.86  
 
None of these processes has an analogue in the case of ordinary treaties, such as 
those of the ILO, ratified by the UK, which only give rise to a strong presumption 
that domestic law should be interpreted in accordance with them.87 Perhaps as a 
result, ILO treaties ratified by the UK have had little practical effect on domestic 
labour laws, exemplified by their minimal effect on the UK’s strike laws.88 They are 
stronger than the means by which domestic legislation gives effect to the European 
                                                 
79 Directive 95/46/EC. 
80 Regulation 2016/679. 
81 The Employment Practices Data Protection Code, issued by the Information Commissioner 
under s.51(3) of the 1998 Act, and available at https://ico.org.uk/media/for-
organisations/documents/1064/the_employment_practices_code.pdf (accessed 24 August 2016).  
82 See supra n. 74 at paras 9-26. 
83 See my advice to the TUC,  supra n.74, at paras 17-18. 
84 See my advice for the TUC, supra n.74, at paras 14-16 and Rasmussen, supra n. 39.  
85 See advice to the TUC, supra n.74, at para. 19 and Case C-479/93, Francovich v Italy [1995] 
ECR I-3843. 
86 Advice to the TUC, supra n.74, at paras 21-25 and Marshall (No.2), supra n. 54, above. 
87 See Hounga v Allen [2014] ICR 847 at para. 50.  
88 See, for example, the very limited impact of ILO Conventions on the right to strike, 
exemplified by the rulings in Metrobus v Unite [2010] ICR 173 and RMT v Serco [2011] ICR 848. 
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Convention on Human Rights (ECHR): the Human Rights Act 1998, which retains 
the power of Parliament to legislate contrary to Convention rights.89 
 
The intriguing counterfactual question for labour historians is what domestic labour 
law would look like now if the UK had never joined the EU. There are obvious 
provisions which it appears the UK would never have adopted but for EU 
membership, illustrated by its resistance to the Directives at the time, its reluctant 
implementation, or the mismatch of the Directives with a domestic labour agenda 
based on promoting a ‘flexible’ labour market. Legislation in this category includes, I 
think, the Working Time Directive; legislation protecting fixed-term, part-time and 
agency workers; all the requirements to inform and consult worker representatives; 
significant elements of the rules protecting employees on transfers of an 
undertaking, such as those which prevent a transferee placing transferred workers 
on the same terms as its existing workforce (a constant thorn in the side of 
businesses); and much of the EU law on health and safety at work. It is doubtful, too, 
that laws protecting against age discrimination would have been enacted, given their 
complexity (which entailed a very long period of consultation about the detail) and 
the contemporary attitude of the government.90  
 
In addition, limits on compensation for discrimination and other breaches of 
employment law would probably still be a common feature of UK employment law 
but for the judgments of the ECJ in cases such as Marshall No.2 and Levez.91 Such caps 
were elements of the original UK legislation on discrimination,92 and accord with 
recent government policy of using damage thresholds where compensation is 
perceived by business as high, illustrated by the recent changes made to the 
compensation recoverable for unfair dismissal. Indeed, the previous Government 
wanted to examine discrimination awards as part of the Employment Law Review it 
conducted between 2010 and 15 ‘in response to business concerns about the 
uncapped nature of awards in cases of discrimination’,93 but was effectively blocked 
by EU law. For similar reasons, I doubt that UK legislature would have allowed 
equal pay laws to spread their tentacles into pensions, requiring complicated and 
costly equalisation of retirement ages and pension benefits for men and women.94 
 
                                                 
89 See especially s.4 and s.6 of the 1998 Act.  
90 See Davies and Freedland, supra n. 26, at 84-86. 
91 Case C-271/91, Marshall, supra n. 54 and Case C-326/96, Levez v TH Jennings [1998] ECR I-
7835. 
92 See, in their original form when enacted, s.65 of the Sex Discrimination Act 1975, s.56 of the 
Race Relations Act 1976, and s.2 of the Equal Pay Act 1970.  
93 BIS, Employment Law Review: Annual Update 2012 (2012), 15-16, available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_ data/file/32146/12-p136-
employment-law-review-2012.pdf (accessed 23 August 2016).  
94 As a result of cases such as e.g. C-262/88, Barber [1990] ECR I-1880. 
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But taking something away is a much more difficult process than not giving it in the 
first place, as any parent knows and as a large body of research on ‘risk aversion’ 
confirms.95 The counterfactual question focussing on the past is an incomplete guide 
to the future. The most difficult exercise of all is to contemplate what is likely to 
happen post-Brexit to the EU-guaranteed employment rights currently in force in UK 
domestic law. This is a highly speculative exercise, but in the next section I 
nonetheless try to highlight some of the factors at play. 
 
 
4. THE POST-BREXIT FUTURE  
 
As a result of the Brexit referendum it is at present likely (but by no means certain) 
that the UK will leave the EU, though the time frame is still unclear.96 But it is pretty 
much unimaginable that once the UK leaves any significant part of the employment 
law derived from the EU would be repealed en bloc immediately or very soon 
afterwards. Rather, the overwhelming likelihood is that the process of deciding 
which elements of EU-derived employment law to ditch will take place gradually, 
over many years, and only once the process of extraction from the EU has been 
completed. There are several reasons for this. 
 
The first requires a little explanation of how implementing legislation works in the  
UK. In broad terms, secondary legislation in UK law is unlawful and ultra vires if it 
does not fall within the scope of a power set out in an Act of Parliament. The statute 
in the UK which gives legal effect to the EU Treaties is the ECA 1972. A good deal  of 
secondary legislation implementing EU law has been introduced under the ECA 
1972, which contains an express power allowing the introduction of secondary 
implementing legislation.97 If the ECA were repealed, as some Brexiteers have called 
for, in theory all the implementing legislation introduced under it would fall away 
too.98 But some implementing employment legislation in the UK is primary 
legislation, such as the Equality Act 2010 protecting against discrimination at work, 
so it would be unaffected by the repeal. Other secondary, implementing legislation 
was introduced not under the ECA but under different primary legislation, and so 
would also be unaffected by repeal of the ECA.99 Some regulations were made under 
both the ECA and another Act, giving rise to bewildering issues as to their legal 
                                                 
95 See e.g. E. Zamir,  Law, Psychology and Morality: The Role of Loss Aversion (Oxford UP, 2015). 
96 And as I write one of the candidates in the contested Labour leadership, Own Smith, has 
said that if he becomes prime minister he will not trigger Article 50 without a further referendum.  
97 ECA 1972, s.2(2). The scope of the power is discussed in United States v Nolan [2015] ICR 
1347. 
98 Watson v Winch [1916] 1 KB 688.  
99 For example, the Fixed-Term Employees (Protection of Less Favourable Treatment) 
Regulations 2002 (SI 2002/2034), giving effect to the Fixed-Term Workers Directive 99/70/EC, made 
under the Employment Act 2000. 
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validity if the ECA alone were repealed.100 This is quite apart from the legal chaos 
that would arise if the ECA (or implementing regulations) were repealed without 
detailed rules explaining the necessary transitional provisions.  
 
The second, more obvious, reason is that not even the most right wing of the pro-
Brexit  Conservatives wishes to repeal all the UK employment legislation which gives 
effect to EU law or which was made under the ECA. Post-Brexit, then, a process is 
likely to begin of identifying which EU-derived employment legislation should be 
repealed. There already exist legal models in the UK for using secondary legislation 
to identify and remove legislation, both secondary and primary legislation, which is 
viewed as constituting a ‘burden’, involving consultation with those who are 
substantially  affected and a rapid Parliamentary process.101 This is the sort of model 
which is likely to be adopted to strip out undesired EU-based legislation after Brexit, 
not confined to the employment sphere. But this process is unlikely to take place 
quickly, given the amount of government time and resources which will be devoted 
to negotiating post-Brexit trading agreements and the need to scrutinise each piece of 
legislation individually. 
 
The likely prospect, then, is that the date of Brexit will precede any assault on the 
substantive employment rights underpinned by EU law. But there will be an interim 
period when the legal waters could become very muddy indeed. Even if the rights 
themselves survive, leaving the EU would presumably put an end to the doctrine of 
direct effect, the ultimate source of which is the TEU.102 It would end, too, the 
jurisdiction of the ECJ to make rulings on preliminary references from courts of a 
‘Member State’ under Article 267 TFEU. These changes are likely to have a 
detrimental impact on workers’ rights in the UK.103 How to interpret existing UK 
legislation implementing or in the field of EU law post-Brexit will then give rise to 
some very awkward questions. The Marleasing duty, requiring national courts to 
interpret national law so far as possible to achieve the result required by EU, is itself 
a product of the Treaties.104 Post-Brexit, when the Treaties no longer apply to the UK, 
should the courts follow earlier, judgments based on an interpretative obligation 
which no longer applies? What weight should be given to pre- or post-Brexit 
judgments of the ECJ made on references from other Member States in relation to 
                                                 
100 For example, the Transfer of Undertakings (Protection of Employment) Regulations 2006 
(SI 2006/246), implementing the Acquired Rights Directive, were made under the ECA and the 
Employment Relations Act 1999.  
101 See e.g.  Part I of the Legislative and Regulatory Reform Act 2006, by which a Minister 
may introduce statutory instruments to remove ‘burdens’ resulting from legislation including 
primary legislation. 
102 See Article 4(3). 
103 See my advice to the TUC, supra n. 74, at para. 12. 
104 Principally the duty of Member States under Article 4(3) TEU: see e.g. Case C-106/89, 
Marleasing [1990] ECR I-4135 and Case C-397/01, Pfeiffer [2004] ECR I-8835. 
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Directives implemented by legislation in the UK? To what extent should UK courts 
abandon the radical approach to interpretation they have hitherto adopted to ensure 
compliance with EU law, and revert to their traditional focus on the ‘ordinary’ 
language? These are uncharted waters, and apply to all areas in the field of EU law. 
They may well require some form of interim legislative response in the interests of 
legal certainty and of avoiding legal chaos in the medium-term.105 
 
But what of the long-term fate of the employment rights guaranteed by EU law? 
Predictions of future government action in this area, which I have described as 
characterised by radical indeterminacy, are dangerous, especially since any changes 
are unlikely to occur in the near future. All one can reasonably do is begin to sketch 
out the policy aims, and the constraints and other factors shaping actual labour 
market regulation, to give some idea of where the UK may be heading. 
 
The first of these factors is the vision of the UK government for employment 
regulation. At present the Labour party is trailing badly in the polls, and the 
prospect is of a Conservative government continuing in power up to and beyond the 
general election scheduled for 2020. Should Labour be elected - and where it will be 
in five years’ time is anyone’s guess - it is unlikely to target any EU-derived 
employment rights for repeal or weakening. Its present policies under Jeremy 
Corbyn are for a radical strengthening of workers’ rights, including compulsory 
collective bargaining for employers with over 250 staff.106 Not even those on the 
Right of the Labour party hint at reducing existing workers’ rights, and almost all 
EU-derived rights are a floor not a ceiling.107 Leaving the EU allows the Labour party 
greater freedom of policy in other areas, such as proposals to renationalise the 
railways, but is has little effect on its employment policy. 
 
What of the Conservative party? Although the labour market philosophy of the 
Conservative party today is not as clearly articulated as the one of the Thatcher 
era,108 the thrust of the policy is in the same direction: a deregulated market, 
dominated by freedom of contract as regards the individual employment 
relationship, coupled with hyper-regulation in order to diminish the collective 
power of trade unions. The last coalition Government revealed its broad philosophy 
in the publication, Flexible, Effective, Fair: Promoting Economic Growth Through a Strong 
                                                 
105 See S. Laws, Article 50 and the Political Constitution (U.K. Const. L. Blog (18 July 2016); 
available at: https://ukconstitutionallaw.org/ accessed 30 August 2016). 
106 See ‘Corbyn Pledges to Scrap Blair Union Laws in Favour of Collective Bargaining’ in The 
Guardian 30 July 2016, available at http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/jul/30/jeremy-
corbyn-scrap-labour-union-laws-pledge (accessed 26 August 2016).  
107 See my advice to the TUC, supra n 74, at para. 29. 
108 See Davies and Freeland, Labour Legislation and Public Policy, n XXX supra., especially 
chapters 910 and E.Green, Ideologies of Conservatism (Oxford UP, 2002), chapter 8. 
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and Efficient Labour Market.109 The flimsy document celebrated the UK’s comparative 
advantage arising from its ‘light touch system of labour regulation’ - according to the 
OECD only surpassed by the USA and Canada among developed countries - and 
made clear the Government’s desire to ‘minimise....intervention in the labour 
market’, with a core of fundamental protections ‘limited to the minimum 
necessary’.110 Following the election of 2015, and now freed from the constraints of a 
coalition, the Conservative Government introduced the Trade Union Act 2016 (TUA 
2016), adding very significant and often insurmountable hurdles to the existing 
labyrinthine rules which restrict unions’ ability to take strike action.111 The influence 
of right wing ‘think tanks’ on the Conservative party remains as strong as ever. The 
genesis of the TUA 2016, for instance, was a paper produced by the think tank, 
Policy Exchange, based on free market theories which questioned whether workers 
should be able to strike at all save in conditions where this served market 
efficiency.112 
 
Up to now, the large, immovable blot on this vision of a highly flexible labour 
market has been EU-derived employment regulations. During the course of the 
debates before Brexit, for example, prominent Conservatives on the ‘leave’ side 
repeatedly complained of the £600 million per week cost of EU regulations, drawing 
on a report from the influential think tank, Open Europe.113 That report, based on 
information in the UK government impact assessments published at the time of draft 
implementing legislation, placed several employment law Directives high up in the 
list of the ‘top 100' costliest EU regulations, in particular the legislation on working 
time and that protecting agency workers.114 Though the assumptions of the impact 
assessments are often questionable and the claims were made  by ‘leavers’ from the 
Right of the Conservative party, they mostly reflect an orthodox Conservative  vision 
of labour market regulation, illustrated by the legislative interventions of the 
                                                 
109 BIS 2011, supra n. 30.  
110 Ibid. at paras 4-9. For similar visions, see BIS, Employment Law 2013: Progress on Reform 
(2013), available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/184892/13-
P136-employment-law-2013-progress-on-reform2.pdf 
111 See the articles in 45(3) Ind.L.J. (2016).  
112 See E. Holmes, A. Lilico and T. Flanagan, Modernising Industrial Relations (Policy Exchange: 
2010), available at 
http://www.policyexchange.org.uk/images/publications/modernising%20industrial%20relations%
20-%20sep%2010.pdf (accessed 25 August 2016). For discussion, see A. Bogg,  Beyond Neo-Liberalism: 
The Trade Union Act 2016 and the Authoritarian State 45(3) Ind.L.J. (2016). 
113 See e.g. the article in the The Guardian, 11 May 2016, available at 
http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2016/may/11/boris-johnson-launches-the-vote-leave-
battlebus-in-cornwall. 
114 Open Europe, Top 100 EU Rules Cost Britain £33.3 bn , available at  
http://openeurope.org.uk/intelligence/britain-and-the-eu/top-100-eu-rules-cost-britain-33-3bn/ 
(accessed 26 August 2008). 
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previous government in areas where EU did not preclude action. 
 
Since the Brexit referendum, however, the prominent leavers have been strangely 
silent on this topic. The latest statement on this fluctuating, opaque policy from 
David Davis MP, the government Minister responsible for negotiating the Brexit deal 
with the EU, headed in the opposite direction. He said that the working class who 
voted for Brexit should not be penalised by losing their employment rights.115 
Pragmatism and electorate appeal may trump economic ideology, as so often in the 
Conservative party’s past.116 But gratitude has its temporal limits, the internal 
tensions with the Conservative party remain, and if the UK economy begins to 
stutter pre- or post-Brexit we can expect the calls for labour market deregulation to 
become more strident. The spotlight is likely to return to old favourites, such as 
capping discrimination awards; repealing the perennial objects of Conservative 
venom, working time and agency workers’ rights; or exempting small businesses 
from employment ‘red tape’.117  
 
There are three other elements to future policy that I want to highlight. They are 
likely to play a central role in shaping the eventual form of labour law regulation in 
the UK. 
 
The first is employment tribunal fees. For the moment they have led to a decrease in 
around 70% of claims compared with the position before they were introduced.118 
Their short-term fate depends upon the judicial review challenge pending before the 
Supreme Court, based the EU principle of effectiveness, and the Ministry of Justice’s 
own internal review, long awaited but still unpublished.119 If they survive in 
something like their current form, a future government may conclude that the 
practical effect of UK employment rights is sufficiently restricted that it is not 
                                                 
115 D. Davis, Trade Deals. Tax Cuts. And Taking Time Before Triggering Article 50. A Brexit 
Economic Strategy for Britain, 14 July 2016, available at  
http://www.conservativehome.com/platform/2016/07/david-davis-trade-deals-tax-cuts-and-
taking-time-before-triggering-article-50-a-brexit-economic-strategy-for-britain.html (accessed 30 
August 2016). 
116 A.Seddon, The Conservative Century in The Conservative Century (A. Seddon & S. Ball eds, 
Oxford UP, 1994). 
117 Something advocated by e.g. the former employment minister, Priti Patel: see ‘Brussels 
diktats “costing families £4,600 a year”’ in the Daily Mail 28 April 2016 (available at 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-3562573/Brussels-diktats-costing-families-4-600-year-
Employment-minister-say-homes-small-businesses-throttled-Brexit-boost-economy-billions.html; 
accessed 30 August 2016). 
118 D. Pyper, F.McGuinness, Employment Tribunal Fees (House of Commons Briefing Paper, 13 
May 2016), 12-13, available at 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/SN07081 (accessed 31 August 
2016). 
119 See the House of Commons Justice Committee report, supra n. 51. 
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necessary to remove the substantive rights. Alternatively, freed from the EU rules on 
effective vindication of rights, it may go further still in using collateral devices, such 
as high tribunal fees, to undermine the effect of the rights. Fees especially deter 
claims of low value: combine high fees with limits on compensation, for example, 
and legal rights on the statute book can become largely symbolic in fact. In such a 
system, the government may have little incentive to take the politically controversial 
step of removing the rights themselves. 
 
The second factor is the type of trade deal which the UK tries to obtain and in fact 
obtains from the EU. At present the UK’s trade deals are an incident of its 
membership of the EU, and by virtue of Article 207 TEU it cannot negotiate 
individual trade deals while still a member. Prior to the referendum, the 
Government produced no clear plan of the trade deal it envisaged with the EU 
should the vote be for Brexit, and still none has been produced. The document the 
government did publish set out details of five possible arrangements - those the EU 
currently has with Norway, Switzerland, Canada and Turkey and a relationship 
based simply on WTO membership - but simply said that the UK would ‘seek the 
best balance of advantage’.120 For the UK, ending free movement of workers is likely 
to be a key issue for the type of deal it wants, given the central role played by 
immigration in the debates before the referendum, whereas the EU may insist on 
retaining those rights for access to the single market. While employment rights are 
unlikely to be anything more than peripheral to the negotiations, the type of deal 
ultimately obtained has important consequences for employment rights.  
 
At one extreme, for example, is the Norway model, involving membership of the 
European Economic Area (EEA). As well as entailing free movement of worker s121 
and submission to the jurisdiction of the EFTA Court, it requires adherence to EU 
employment legislation, with the exception of EU equality law outside sex 
discrimination.122 The adoption of the Norway model, then, would leave UK labour 
law pretty much unchanged from its current position in relation to EU law, given 
that anti-discrimination law on race, disability and sexual orientation (for example) 
has achieved a large degree of political consensus within the UK; but the inclusion of 
free movement of workers on this model makes this model politically unappetising 
to the UK government. At the other end of the spectrum, the Canadian trading 
agreement with the EU, which seems to be the one currently in vogue with the 
government, contains only an obligation of mutual recognition of professional 
                                                 
120 HM Government, Alternatives to Membership: Possible Models for the United Kingdom Outside 
the European Union (March 2016), at 5; available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/504604/Alterna
tives_to_membership_-_possible_models_for_the_UK_outside_the_EU.pdf (accessed 30 August 2016). 
121 Article 28 EEA Agreement and Annex V.  
122 Articles 66-70 and the instruments listed in Annex XVIII of the EEA Agreement.  
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qualifications.123 The EU, of course, may have other views and strategies to pursue, 
and employment rights may end up being small bargaining chips in a bigger trading 
game, which will take many years to play out. 
 
A third important factor is the position of the devolved administrations in Scotland, 
Wales and Northern Ireland. While Wales and England were both in favour of 
leaving the EU, in Scotland 62 per cent of those voting were in favour of remain, as 
were 56 per cent of voters in Northern Ireland. These different results place further 
strain on the unity of the UK, less than two years after a close referendum on Scottish 
independence. Shortly after the referendum the First Minister for Scotland, Nicola 
Sturgeon, and the Scottish Parliament both made clear their wish to remain in the 
EU.124 At present employment rights and duties, industrial relations and health and 
safety at work are ‘reserved’ matters, outside the scope of the Scottish Parliament’s 
legislative powers, including implementing EU law in these areas.125 By contrast, the 
devolved Northern Ireland legislature has the general power to legislate in the 
employment field, save for the national minimum wage,126 though it too must not 
legislate contrary to EU law.127 Triggering Article 50 is not a decision for either the 
Scottish Parliament or the Northern Ireland Assembly.128  
 
No doubt this devolution legislation will require amendment, post-Brexit, to remove 
the binding force given to EU law. But there are other issues mor e specific to 
employment law. The prospect of the London-based UK Parliament, post-Brexit, 
legislating to remove EU-derived worker rights not only in England but also in 
Wales and Scotland is unlikely to be welcomed by the devolved Welsh or Scottish 
administrations or their electorate, which tend to be more to the Left. Objections of 
this sort were already visible during the passage of the Trade Union Act 2016 
through Parliament.129 Any moves to deregulate employment law across the UK may 
well generate increased pressure for greater devolution of employment policy and 
law. The arguments of the ‘leavers’, that leaving the EU would give them democratic 
control over ‘their’ employment laws, will then be deployed by the devolved 
countries against the UK government and Parliament. 
                                                 
123 See HM Government, Alternatives to Membership, supra n. 120, at 30-34. 
124 For the background, see V.Miller (ed.),  Brexit: Impact Across Policy Areas (House of 
Commons Briefing Paper, 26 August 2016) at 165-172, available at 
http://researchbriefings.parliament.uk/ResearchBriefing/Summary/CBP-7213 (accessed 30 August 
2016). 
125 Scotland Act 1998, ss 29-30 and Schedule 5, paras H1 and H2. Note too that the Scottish 
Parliament must not legislate contrary to EU law under s.29(2)(d).  
126 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s. 4 and s.6 and Schedule 3 para. 21. 
127 Northern Ireland Act 1998, s.6(2)(d). The settlement in Wales includes some employment 
matters peripherally: see In re Agricultural Sector (Wales) Bill [2014] 1 WLR 2622. 
128 Scotland Act 1998, Schedule 5, para. 7; Northern Ireland Act 1998, Schedule 2 para. 3. 
129 A. Bogg, supra n. 112. 
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5. CONCLUSION 
 
If Brexit happens, UK employment law will enter uncharted waters. Tribunal fees 
have already had a dramatic effect on employment rights but over the past forty or 
so years we have grown accustomed to a floor of fundamental EU social rights, 
setting clear limits on policy and law in this area. UK government opposition to 
those rights, and the dialogue between national courts and the ECJ, have become 
central organising themes of UK labour law. When and if Brexit happens the fate of 
those rights, and the procedural rules and remedies which underpin them, is very 
unclear. Their legal interpretation post-Brexit will be difficult enough, but the future 
shift in UK labour law is highly unpredictable. The Brexit referendum has only 
temporarily papered over the different positions within the Government, the 
electorate and the regions, both on labour market policy and beyond, which the need 
to open negotiations on the terms of Brexit will expose anew. Changes to existing 
EU-derived employment laws are unlikely to occur soon after Brexit, and not until 
after the general election in 2020, when the shape of policy alone is hard to predict, 
let alone the other factors affecting the adoption of labour laws. We are entering 
strange but interesting times. 
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